Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Appeals by Wachtler, Sol
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 59 
Number 3 Volume 59, Spring 1985, Number 3 Article 1 
June 2012 
Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Appeals 
Sol Wachtler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Wachtler, Sol (1985) "Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Appeals," St. John's Law Review: 
Vol. 59 : No. 3 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol59/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 59 SPRING 1985 NUMBER 3
STARE DECISIS AND A CHANGING NEW
YORK COURT OF APPEALS
THE HONORABLE SOL WACHTLER*
INTRODUCTION
The judicial complement of the New York Court of Appeals
has undergone dramatically greater changes in the recent past than
at any other time in its 115-year history,' and the next two years
promise even more change. In addition to the appointment of a
new Chief Judge, the Court has seen three of its members retire
and be replaced since April, 1983; within the next two years, two
more of the sitting associate judges will retire. At present, for the
first time, all members of the Court are serving by virtue of guber-
natorial appointment rather than by election. This dramatic
change in the Court's composition has led to speculation that the
Court's position on legal issues may be subject to similarly dra-
matic change. The purpose of this Article is to allay that fear by
explaining the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis,2 which
* Chief Judge, Court of Appeals, State of New York; B.A., 1951, LL.B., 1952, Washing-
ton and Lee University.
I See generally H. COHEN AND A. KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
§ 4, at 18-22 (rev. ed. 1952). The present Court of Appeals was created by the Constitutional
Convention of 1869 and first sat in July of 1870. From 1846 to that time, the Court had
eight members. Four judges were elected for 8-year terms in statewide elections, and the
other four were the Supreme Court Justices having the shortest remaining terms, each of
whom would serve as an acting Court of Appeals Judge for I year. For the first several
decades of New York history, the highest court of the state was composed of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, the members of the State Senate, and the Chancellor, and it was known
as the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors, modeled after the
"Lord's Court" in the House of Lords in England. Id.
2 The term stare decisis is actually a shorthand expression for the doctrine stare deci-
sis et non quieta movere, which has been translated variously to mean "to stand by deci-
sions and not to disturb settled points," Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of
Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 31 A.BA J. 501, 501-02
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assures an element of stability in the Court, while providing a pro-
cess by which orderly change may occur.'
I must confess that when I first came to the Court, after five
years as a trial judge, I thought it would be both easy and desirable
to bring my enlightened perspective to the law and clear out the
dust bin of archaic legal thinking, thus bringing a renaissance to
New York jurisprudence. After a few months, however, I came to
appreciate the need to adhere to precedent in our common-law
process. My notions regarding the significance of stare decisis
changed drastically.
Although Blackstone stated that it was subject to exception,4
until recently, stare decisis has been a doctrine rigidly adhered to
in the House of Lords. 5 In contrast, a more moderate view has al-
(1945) (quoting J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 477 (Lacy's ed. 1889)), to "let the decision stand
and do not disturb things which have been settled," A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JusTICE 74 (1971),
to "stand by the precedents and do not disturb the calm," Reed, Stare Decisis and Consti-
tutional Law, 9 PA. B.Q. 131, 131 (1938), and, somewhat less literally and more tongue-in-
cheek, "the doctrine that teaches judges that it is often wise to let sleeping dogs lie," Ste-
vens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1983).
3 See Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 735-36 (1949). In 1949, speaking
at the eighth annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Justice William 0. Douglas stated that
while stare decisis does bring forth security, such security is not achieved by a refusal to
change, but rather "through constant change, through the wise discarding of old ideas that
have outlived their usefulness." Id.
4 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69-70 (Cooley's ed. 1884). Blackstone proclaimed
that:
[I]t is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points
come again in litigation. . .. Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former
determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to
the divine law ... The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules
must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust: for though their reason be not
obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former times as not to sup-
pose they acted wholly without consideration.
Id.
, The rule of stare decisis is generally regarded as having been adopted by the House of
Lords in London St. Tramways Co. v. London County Council, 1898 A.C. 375, 379. See
Fairlie, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis in British Courts of Last Resort, 35 MICH. L. REV. 946,
953-54 (1937). The rigidity of the application of stare decisis in England can be seen in the
comments of Lord Justice Buckley in Olympian Oil Cake Co. v. Produce Brokers Co., 112
L.T.R. 744, 748 (1914): " I am unable to adduce any reason to show that the decision which
I am about to pronounce is right. On the contrary, if I were free to follow my own opinion
... I should say that it is wrong. But I am bound by authority.. "Id.; see Note, Stare
Decisis, 34 HARv. L. REv. 74, 75 n.6 (1920).
Nevertheless, the strict adherence to precedent in English courts was repudiated in an
announcement by Lord Chancellor Gardiner in 1966, the circumstances of which are re-
counted in Stone, 1966 and All That! Loosing the Chains of Precedent, 69 COLuM. L. REv.
1162, 1162-63 (1969). For additional treatment of the rule in England, see generally R.
CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 103-22 (3d ed. 1977); 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARY 474 (14th
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the degree of authority belonging to such a precedent depends, of
necessity, on its agreement with the spirit of the times or the
judgment of subsequent tribunals upon its correctness as a state-
ment of the existing or actual law, and the compulsion or exi-
gency of the doctrine is, in the last analysis, moral and intellec-
tual, rather than arbitrary or inflexible.9
THE STABILITY ASPECT OF THE DOCTRINE
The approach to stare decisis employed by the Court of Ap-
peals in recent years recognizes, as already suggested, the "con-
servative" goals of efficiency, predictability, and uniformity. With-
out a general policy of reliance on precedent, said Cardozo, "the
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if
every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could
not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the
courses laid by others who had gone before him."10
If courts are not obliged to follow precedent, the everyday bus-
iness affairs of men and women would be impossible to conduct.
Acknowledging that the element of continuity is essential to pro-
tecting the interests of the diverse groups that make up society,
Chief Judge Loughran cogently stated that: "[I]t is important to
bear in mind that the overruling of a precedent may often cause
more harm than good by the unsettling effect that it may have
upon transactions concluded in reliance on the previously declared
rules." '11 Indeed, it is common knowledge that every attorney who
drafts a contract or will, or renders business advice of any kind,
relies on the notion that, if litigation becomes necessary, the court
will give the document or act the same effect it has given similar
documents or acts in the past.12
A predisposition to follow precedent assures that like cases
will be treated similarly, a precept that is the cornerstone of our
judicial system of laws.13 Of equal importance, stare decisis guar-
antees uniformity by assuring that similar cases will be treated
similarly, even if before different judges. This uniformity of treat-
ment of different litigants is one of special concern in this time of
9 L. CHAMBERLAIN, STARE DEcisis 19.
10 B. CARozo, supra note 8, at 149.
n Loughran, supra note 8, at 4.
12 See Douglas, supra note 3, at 735; von Moschzisker, supra note 8, at 410.
13 See Wachtler, America-A Nation of Laws and of People, 22 CATH. LAW. 101, 103
(1976).
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ways prevailed in our own country,' particularly in the New York
Court of Appeals. 7 This moderate approach serves two competing
goals. On the one hand is a recognition that following precedent
provides necessary stability in the law, thereby serving the goals of
efficiency, predictability, and uniformity. On the other hand, how-
ever, this stability aspect is tempered by a recognition that change
is, in some cases, necessary.8 As Lord Chamberlain aptly stated:
A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge made after
argument on a question of law fairly arising in a case, and neces-
sary to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent, in
the same court or in other courts of equal or lower rank, in subse-
quent cases, where "the very point" is again in controversy; but
ed. 1896); Lewis, The History of Judicial Precedent (pts. I-IV), 46 LAW Q. REV. 207, 341
(1930), 47 LAW Q. REv. 411 (1931), 47 LAW Q. REv. 231 (1932).
' See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). In Helvering, Justice Frankfurter
described the approach to stare decisis in the United States: "[sitare decisis embodies an
important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the
psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations." Id.
A complete bibliography of materials discussing this topic is beyond the scope of this
Article; among the leading texts and articles are: E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE (rev. ed.
1974); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (2d ed. 1951); Catlett, The Development of the
Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REV.
158 (1946); Covington, The American Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 24 TEX. L. REv. 190 (1946);
Douglas, supra note 3; Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897); Jones,
Dyson Distinguished Lecture: Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L. REV.
11 (1983); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941); Stevens, supra note
2.
7 See, e.g., Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 890-91, 467 N.E.2d 517, 518,
478 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854-55 (1984) (Cooke, C.J., dissenting) (although stare decisis should be
treated with respect, it is not inflexible); Loschiavo v. Port Auth., 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 1043, 448
N.E.2d 1351, 1353, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (1983) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (stare decisis
does not mean case may not be challenged).
8 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 393, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
The flexible aspect of stare decisis is apparent in Judge Cardozo's MacPherson opinion.
Judge Cardozo stated that although the concept of "imminently dangerous instrumentality"
may once properly have been confined to "things whose normal function it is to injure or
destroy," id. at 387, 111 N.E. at 1052, present conditions required that the concept be modi-
fied to include any item that could reasonably be expected "to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made," id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. Judge Cardozo added that
"[p]recedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of
travel to-day .... [The things subject to a principle] are whatever the needs of life in a
developing civilization require them to be." Id. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
Articles and texts discussing the doctrine as applied by the New York Court of Appeals
include: B. CARDozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142 (1921); Loughran, Some
Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1953); von Moschzis-
ker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARv. L. REv. 409 (1924). For a relevant
discussion of the doctrine as applied by another leading state court of last resort, see Schae-
fer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CH. L. REV. 3 (1966).
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rapidly changing personnel on our Court of Appeals. 14
Bearing in mind these "conservative" goals and principles, the
question becomes in which types of cases does a relatively strict
adherence to precedent outweigh a need for change? First, and
perhaps foremost, are those cases in which the rule is one necessa-
rily relied upon when structuring the transfer of property, such as
cases involving wills, title to land, commercial transactions, and
contracts.15 Second are those cases involving the construction of a
statute, especially when the rule involved is long-standing, since
the legislature is in a better position to change the statute if the
court's interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative intent.16
Other cases in which it has been said that adherence to precedent
should be closely followed are those in which, as Cardozo observed,
"the commitment to an outworn policy is too firm to be broken by
the tools of the judicial process.'"
A recent case in which these three paradigms coalesced and
compelled adherence to precedent is In re Estate of Eckart.'8 In
14 See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 491, 348 N.E.2d 894, 903, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
427 (1976).
,5 See, e.g., Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 388-89, 448
N.E.2d 413, 419, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 752 (1983) (Wachtler, J., dissenting); City of Buffalo v.
Cargill, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 7, 17-18, 374 N.E.2d 372, 377-78, 403 N.Y.S.2d 473, 479 (1978); Peo-
ple v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 489, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901-02, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425-26 (1976);
see Douglas, supra note 3, at 735-36; Loughran, supra note 8, at 4.
16 See People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427, 433-34, 437 N.E.2d 1146, 1150, 452 N.Y.S.2d
389, 393 (1982); Loughran, supra note 8, at 7.
17 B. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 63. Perhaps the best modern example of the policy that
some outworn approaches are not appropriately changed by the judiciary is the line of cases
upholding the doctrine first recognized in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). In Seider, the Court held that quasi in rem jurisdiction could be
obtained over a non-resident defendant by attaching the defendant's liability insurer's con-
tractual obligation to defend and indemnify the defendant, as long as the insurer was pre-
sent or doing business in New York. Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. The
doctrine was upheld as constitutional in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 308-09 &
n.2, 234 N.E.2d 669, 670 & n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 & n.2 (1967). By 1976, however, the
reaffirmance of the doctrine by the New York Court of Appeals was "on the ground of stare
decisis alone," Neuman v. Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 999, 1000, 355 N.E.2d 294, 294, 387 N.Y.S.2d
240, 240 (1976) (mem.), and, soon after, the Court restricted its scope by making it unavaila-
ble to non-resident plaintiffs, again recognizing the continued reliance on stare decisis, see
Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 366 N.E.2d 253, 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1977).
Even after a strong warning from the United States Supreme Court that such jurisdiction
might violate due process, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977), the Court of
Appeals continued to uphold the Seider doctrine, see Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 891,
383 N.E.2d 110, 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (1978) (per curiam). The final blow came in
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), in which the Supreme Court struck down the Seider
rationale as violative of due process, id. at 332.
Is 39 N.Y.2d 493, 348 N.E.2d 905, 384 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1976).
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Eckart, the testatrix was survived by a son and a daughter.'9 Her
will provided that, if the children survived her, they should each
receive a legacy of $50.00 and expressly stated that there was no
further testamentary provision for either the children or any other
relative. 0 The rest and residue of her estate was bequeathed to a
charitable institution." The children contested the charitable dis-
position pursuant to former section 5-3.3 of the Estates, Powers
and Trusts Law.2 2 Section 5-3.3 provided that an issue may contest
a charitable disposition only if such issue were to "receive a pecu-
niary benefit from a successful contest. '2 3 Therefore, the determi-
native question was whether the children lacked standing because
they would not receive a pecuniary benefit from a successful con-
test by virtue of the negative bequest in the will.2
A precedent of the Court, In re Estate of Cairo,2 5 had consid-
ered an attack to a charitable bequest similar to that in Eckart.
The Cairo Court held that language in the will stating "I make no
bequest to my grandson... for good and sufficient reason" consti-
tuted a negative bequest, or disinheritance, which barred the
grandson from sharing in any property passing by intestacy.26
Therefore, since he could not benefit from any successful contest,
the grandson was held to have no standing to challenge the chari-
table bequest.2 7
In Eckart, the appellate division had refused to apply Cairo.2 8
' Id. at 495-96, 348 N.E.2d at 906, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
22 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3(a)(1) (McKinney 1981) (repealed 1981).
Former § 5-3.3 provided in part:
(a) A person may make a testamentary disposition of his entire estate to any
person for a benevolent, charitable ... or [other] purpose, provided that if any
such disposition is contested by the testator's surviving issue or parents, it shall be
valid only to the extent of one-half of such testator's estate, . subject to the
following:
(1) An issue or parent may not contest a disposition as invalid unless he will re-
ceive a pecuniary benefit from a successful contest as a beneficiary under the will
or as a distributee.
Id.
2 4 Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d at 496-97, 348 N.E.2d at 906, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
22 29 N.Y.2d 527, 272 N.E.2d 574, 324 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971) (mem.).
28 Id. at 527-28, 272 N.E.2d at 574-75, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
27 See id.
28 In re Estate of Eckart, 48 App. Div. 2d 61, 64, 368 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (2d Dep't 1975)
(mem.) (Christ, J., concurring), rev'd, 39 N.Y.2d 493, 348 N.E.2d 905, 384 N.Y.S.2d 429
(1976).
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A concurring justice opined that Cairo was wrongly decided, since
it looked to the testatrix's intention when, under the statute, such
intention was immaterial. 29 The concurring opinion stated that, al-
though the statute presumed that the testatrix intended to give
more than one half of her estate to charity and to disinherit the
issue or parent, the very object of the statute was to limit a testa-
trix's power to disinherit in such a manner.30
The Court of Appeals held that the nominal bequests in the
case were the functional equivalent of the disinheritance provision
of the will in Cairo, thus rendering the precedent directly on point.
After acknowledging the considerable criticism to which the Cairo
decision had been subjected, the Court nonetheless decided to fol-
low it. 31 The Court based the decision on the three major consider-
ations outlined above,32 finding that this was the type of case in'
which the need for change in the law was outweighed by the "con-
servative" policies of efficiency, predictability, and uniformity. In
so doing, the Court favored the application of the doctrine of stare
decisis.33 First, the Court stated the general rule that "once the
courts have interpreted a statute any change in the rule will be left
to the Legislature, particularly where the courts' interpretation is a
long standing one."'34 Of course, the Court acknowledged that "if a
recent holding interpreting a statute is out of harmony with a long
line of well-reasoned opinions, the courts need not wait for the
Legislature to repair the damage" and that, "even when the error
is made at the outset, in an initial decision interpreting a novel
statute, the court may at a later date change direction. '35 These
statements indicate that stare decisis, even in those classes of
cases in which the reasons for adherence are most compelling, is
not a rigid and inflexible doctrine.
Second, and even more influential to the Eckart decision, was
the nature of the question at issue.36 The Court stated that cases
involving transfers of property generally result in reliance, and
therefore stability is to be favored over finding the "'correct' rule
29 48 App. Div. 2d at 64, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 30 (Christ, J., concurring).
20 Id. (Christ, J., concurring).
21 39 N.Y.2d at 502, 348 N.E.2d at 910, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
32 See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
33 See 39 N.Y.2d at 502, 348 N.E.2d at 910, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
34 Id. at 499-500, 348 N.E.2d at 908, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
35 Id. at 499, 348 N.E.2d at 908, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
"8 Id. at 500, 348 N.E.2d at 908, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
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of law."' 37 Thus, the Court noted that the policy of strict adherence
to precedent in cases involving land titles, commercial transac-
tions, and contracts should apply equally to the law governing
wills. 38
Finally, in declining to upset settled precedent, the Court de-
ferred to the principle that the legislature is capable of construc-
tively changing a statute if necessary.3 9 This principle was clearly
present in Eckart, since it appeared that even overruling Cairo
would not achieve the desired result of limiting the negative be-
quest. An examination of the legislative history of the statute re-
vealed that while Cairo created an exception to the statute by al-
lowing the testator expressly to disinherit any potential challengers
of the will, "the statute itself permits the same result if the testa-
tor simply creates a gift over to one not qualified to contest. '40 The
Court concluded that the legislative purpose of section 5-3.3 was
frustrated not by the Cairo opinion but by the statute itself.
"Adoption of a new rule by this court would not alter the net re-
sult, and thus there is no compelling reason to change the estab-
lished rule. 4
1
THE FLEXIBILITY ASPECT OF THE DOCTRINE
There are, of course, cases in which the doctrine of stare deci-
sis should not be adhered to so rigidly. In any of these types of
cases, the basic prerequisite to be satisfied before abandoning stare
decisis is that the necessity for change in a particular area of the
law outweighs the conservative policies that underly the promotion
of adherence to the doctrine. This approach to the application of
stare decisis in New York indicates that the doctrine is "moral and
intellectual, rather than arbitrary and inflexible."42 Chief Judge
Cardozo similarly stated:
that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has
been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the
social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and
full abandonment. .. . There should be greater readiness to
abandon an untenable position when the rule to be discarded may
37 Id.
'8 Id., 348 N.E.2d at 908-09, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
Id. at 502, 348 N.E.2d at 910, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
40 Id.
41 Id.
4 L. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 9, at 19.
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not reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct of
the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the prod-
uct of institutions or conditions which have gained a new signifi-
cance or development with the progress of the years.43
In which types of cases should the doctrine of stare decisis be
adhered to less rigidly? As mentioned in Eckart, courts more read-
ily reexamine rules they themselves have promulgated, for example
common-law rules of tort liability.4 4 Interpretations of constitu-
tional, as opposed to statutory, provisions are also more properly
changed by the judiciary, in light of the far greater difficulty of
securing a corrective amendment of a constitution.45 In the realm
of procedural, as opposed to substantive law, courts have overruled
precedent with perhaps the least reservation, for the policies that
compel strict adherence to stare decisis are simply not as strong
when substantive rights are not involved.46 In criminal cases, any
change in rule or statutory interpretation that would be detrimen-
tal to a defendant should be avoided, and may indeed violate due
process, but changes favorable to a defendant should be, and fre-
quently are, made.47
A recent example in the Court of Appeals of the application of
these principles is Silver v. Great American Insurance CO.48 The
Silver Court considered whether factors other than residency
should be addressed in a forum non conveniens motion.49 The prior
New York rule had been that forum non conveniens would not be
invoked if one of the parties was a New York resident.5" The Court
43 B. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 150-51.
44 Excellent recent examples of such reexamination in the realm of tort law include the
abandonment of the distinctions among injured plaintiffs in premises liability cases, see
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 239-40, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (1976),
and the development of strict products liability, see Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342,
298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973).
4" See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419-
20 (1983); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring);
see also von Moschzisker, supra note 8, at 420-21 (original error not to be perpetrated in
constitutional cases when legislative correction available); Wachtler, supra note 13, at 102-
13 (Miranda rights product of recent expansive interpretation of fifth and sixth
amendments).
'" See B. CARDozo, supra note 8, at 156; Loughran, supra note 8, at 14; von Moschzis-
ker, supra note 8, at 420.
47 See von Moschzisker, supra note 8, at 418-19; see also Wachtler, supra note 13, at
102-03 (expansive reading of fifth and sixth amendments).
4a 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972).
49 See id. at 361, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
1o Id.
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determined that reason and justice required relaxation of this rule
and that residency should be only one of several factors consid-
ered.51 In altering the former standard, the Court proclaimed that
stare decisis does not require blind adherence, especially when the
rule was court-made and procedural.5 2 "Having concluded that rea-
son and substantial justice call for modifying our prior decisions
and relaxing our inflexible rule, there is nothing to deter this court
from so doing."'53
An interesting problem arises when there is a long line of cases
stating one rule of law and a few recent cases stating another.5 In
attempting to apply stare decisis, the question develops, "[w]hich
is the stare decisis: The odd cases or the line of development never
fully criticized or rejected? '55
In People v. Hobson,5" the Court addressed this issue. Answer-
ing that the long line of cases should be accorded the effects of
stare decisis, Chief Judge Breitel cogently and persuasively argued
against a mechanistic, "last in, first out" application of the doc-
trine.57 Noting that the relative recency of a case does not deter-
mine that it should be accorded stare decisis effect, the Court held
that the earlier line of cases was "intrinsically sounder and verified
by experience," and therefore should be followed .5
Stare decisis, if it is to be more than shibboleth, requires more
subtle analysis. Indeed, the true doctrine by its own vitality
1 Id.
52 Id. at 363, 278 N.E.2d at 623, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
53 Id.
See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485-86, 348 N.E.2d 894, 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
423 (1976).
5 Id. at 487, 348 N.E.2d at 900, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
56 Id. at 479, 348 N.E.2d at 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
17 See id. at 487, 348 N.E.2d at 900, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 424. The Hobson Court considered
whether an accused in custody, represented by a lawyer in connection with a criminal inves-
tigation, may waive his right to counsel in the absence of his lawyer. Id. at 481, 348 N.E.2d
at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420. An older line of cases, beginning with People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968), had held that the accused may not so
waive this right. See id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. A more recent
"trend" of three cases, however, "departed from [this] evident rule." Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at
485, 348 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423 (citing People v. Wooden, 31 N.Y.2d 753, 290
N.E.2d 436, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972) (mem.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973); People v.
Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971);
People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 945 (1971)). The Hobson Court decided to follow the cases consistent with Arthur. See
39 N.Y.2d at 487, 348 N.E.2d at 900, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
08 39 N.Y.2d at 487, 348 N.E.2d at 900, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
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should not, perversely, give to its violation strength and stability.
That would be like the parricide receiving mercy because he is an
orphan. The odd cases rode roughshod over stare decisis and now
would be accorded stare decisis as their legitimate right, whether
or not they express sound, good, or acceptable doctrine.6 9
Moving from the specific to the general, Chief Judge Breitel
issued a particularly apt warning, sure to be followed by the pre-
sent bench:
Distinctions in the application and withholding of stare deci-
sis require a nice delicacy and judicial self-restraint. At the root
of the techniques [of the application of stare decisis] must be a
humbling assumption, often true, that no particular court as it is
then constituted possesses a wisdom surpassing that of its prede-
cessors. Without this assumption there is jurisprudential anarchy.
There are standards for the application or withholding of stare
decisis, the ignoring of which may produce just that anarchy.
The ultimate principle is that a court is an institution and
not merely a collection of individuals; just as a higher court com-
mands superiority over a lower not because it is wiser or better
but because it is institutionally higher. This is what is meant, in
part, as the rule of law and not of men. 0
CONCLUSION
Judiciously applied in a proper case, the doctrine of stare de-
cisis will allay the fears of those who look with apprehension upon
the ongoing personnel changes in the Court of Appeals. Perhaps
more importantly, however, the prudent withholding of application
of the doctrine, in accordance with the principles recounted above,
will quiet the concerns of those who see the same changes as an
excuse for the Court to forego its role as one of the leading courts
of last resort in the nation. The New York Court of Appeals has
had the courage to reflect in its judgments not inherited institu-
tions, but its principles, its morality, and its own informed sense of
justice. I am confident that my colleagues can strike the necessary
89 Id.
60 Id. at 488, 491, 348 N.E.2d at 901, 903, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 425, 427.
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balance between stability and innovation, and I look forward to
working with them to meet that challenge.
